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Abstract
 
This paper is a critical review article of Paul Patton’s book, 
 
Deleuze and the Political
 
,
and analyzes the relationship between Deleuze and the ‘liberal’ tradition of political
philosophy. It focuses on three concepts drawn from the liberal tradition – norma-
tivity, freedom and judgment – and in each case shows how these concepts are capable
of being transformed in light of Deleuze’s philosophy. For Deleuze, a truly ‘norma-
tive’ principle must be a principle of creation as well as critique: it must not only
provide norms for condemning abuses of power, but also a means for transforming
norms that have themselves become abuses of power. From a Deleuzian perspective,
the normative is thus seen as the condition for the production of the new. The liberal
notion of ‘negative freedom’ in turn finds itself transformed into the stronger notion
of ‘critical freedom’ (Tully), which entails the freedom to critique and create, to
transform (and not merely pursue) one’s own interest and desires. This entails,
finally, an exercise of a kind of judgement outside pre-existing rules or norms that
would be truly creative of the new (e.g. the production of new rights). A concluding
section of the concept of the ‘social imaginary’ shows how Deleuze’s work might
contribute to a transformation and rejuvenation of the liberal tradition itself.
Keywords: Deleuze; liberalism; normativity; freedom; judgement; social imaginary.
 
Paul Patton’s 
 
Deleuze and the Political
 
 is without doubt one of the most signifi-
cant books yet written on the work of Gilles Deleuze. It is a short book, but its
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brevity belies its depth. It approaches Deleuze’s thought from a specific
perspective – the question of the ‘political’ (the book is part of Routledge’s
‘Thinking the Political’ series) – yet at the same time it provides a succinct and
subtle assessment of Deleuze’s philosophy as a whole.
 
1
 
 The book contains
concise overviews of such ‘idiosyncratic’ (Patton 2000: 1) Deleuzian concepts as
‘virtual multiplicities’, ‘machinic assemblages’, ‘becomings’ and ‘deterritorial-
izations’, which will be invaluable to readers new to Deleuze’s thought. At the
specifically political level, it also contains the most extensive discussion yet of
the abstract typology of social formations that constitutes the fundamental
innovation of 
 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia
 
 (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 1987),
including Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s important but ill-understood concept of
‘nomadic war-machines’. On both these fronts, Patton’s analyses of Deleuze’s
concepts, though necessarily selective, are exemplary. Readers will find Patton
to be a reliable and judicious guide through the labyrinth of Deleuze’s novel
concepts and political terminology.
 
Deleuze and the Political
 
 is a personal book as well. Patton is not only a well-
known scholar of Deleuze but also a political thinker in his own right, having
written widely on the history of modern political philosophy (see Patton 1989,
1993, 1998). In reading the book, and particularly the chapter on power, one gets
a clear sense of the figures who have influenced Patton’s own political thought,
including Hobbes and Rawls as much as Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze.
Patton has also written on Aboriginal land rights in Australia, and published
important analyses of the landmark 1992 Mabo case (Patton 1995, 1996); the
final chapter of the book, which is one of its most original sections, attempts to
examine and re-analyze the issues of colonization and native title from a specif-
ically Deleuzian perspective. 
 
Deleuze and the Political
 
 can therefore be read not
only as a commentary on Deleuze but as a synthetic work of Patton’s own, the
result of years of research and reflection, bringing together these various inter-
ests into a coherent (if brief) whole.
Of the many riches in 
 
Deleuze and the Political
 
,
 
 
 
I should like to focus here on a
single aspect of the book, namely, Patton’s analysis of Deleuze’s relation to the
‘liberal’ tradition of political philosophy. In my opinion, this is one of the most
important contributions of Patton’s study, if only because Deleuze’s political
thought has usually been read in the context of the Marxist tradition, and not the
liberal tradition. While Patton does not ignore this Marxist heritage, Deleuze’s
relationship to Marxism is already well known and well documented. Deleuze
explicitly characterized himself as a Marxist, insisting that ‘any political philos-
ophy must turn on the analysis of capitalism and the ways it has developed’
(Deleuze 1995b: 171). But, as Jean-François Lyotard observed long ago, 
 
Capi-
talism and Schizophrenia
 
 nonetheless contains an implicit critique of Marx, since a
number of classical Marxist concepts, such as the super- and infra-structure, the
workers’ struggle, the proletariat and work-value theory, drop out of Deleuze and
Guattari’s analyses completely: they are neither analyzed nor criticized, but
simply ignored (Lyotard 1972). Moreover, traditional Marxism taught that there
was a limit beyond which the capitalist machine would break apart and finally
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collapse, and Marxist politics was built on the search for this limit, that is, for the
revolutionary ‘conditions’ that would make possible the appearance of a new type
of social formation – first ‘crude communism’ (the abolition of private property),
then the positivity of a ‘fully developed humanism’. Deleuze and Guattari likewise
abandon this eschatological conception entirely, defining capitalism in terms of its
lines of flight and its minorities rather than its contradictions and classes (capitalist
versus proletariat) (see Deleuze 1995b: 171–2). This strategy in no way implies a
rejection of Marxism, since Marx himself insisted that his own analyses of capi-
talism would necessarily have to be modified in light of changing conditions.
Deleuze and Guattari are therefore able, without inconsistency, to situate them-
selves squarely in the Marxist tradition, while at the same time rejecting crucial
Marxist concepts. The new concepts proposed in their analyses, they insist, are
those required by the new problematics posed by the present state of capitalism.
The result is a Marxist politics that functions with a new set of political concepts,
such as lines of flight, difference and becomings, all of which Patton analyzes in
detail (see, e.g., Patton 2000: 6–9).
In contrast to this critical affirmation of the Marxist tradition, however,
Deleuze’s relationship to the liberal tradition of political thought is much more
tenuous, and often negative. Patton notes on his opening page that Deleuze’s work
‘shows an almost complete lack of engagement with the central problems and
normative commitments of Anglo-American political thought’ (2000: 1), largely
ignoring the issues that most concern the liberal tradition, such as ‘the nature of
justice, freedom, or democracy’ or ‘normativity’ or ‘procedural justification’
(2000: 1). If Deleuze was willing to ignore certain Marxist concepts, one might say
that he was more or less willing to ignore the concepts of the liberal tradition 
 
in
toto
 
. This is where Patton intervenes: could not the conceptual apparatus of the
liberal tradition, he asks, be open to a similar transformation from a Deleuzian
perspective, just as Deleuze himself transformed the Marxist tradition? Patton’s
book in this way injects itself as a forceful intervention in the current reception of
Deleuze’s thought: it stages a complex confrontation between Deleuze’s political
thought and the liberal tradition, in the context of which it attempts to demon-
strate not only the contemporary relevance of Deleuze’s concepts, but also the
potential they have to transform 
 
both
 
 the Marxist and liberal traditions of political
philosophy.
 
2
 
 In proposing such a confrontation, Patton is staking out a new and
rich territory in the study of Deleuze, and setting out a research agenda that will
no doubt be taken up by others. Patton necessarily pursues this agenda somewhat
obliquely in 
 
Deleuze and the Political
 
, given the several aims of the book, and my
aim in what follows is simply to highlight the way in which this particular trajec-
tory unfolds in the course of Patton’s analyses.
 
The import of Deleuze’s analytic of concepts
 
In 
 
What is Philosophy?
 
 Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy, famously, as the
 
creation of concepts
 
 (1994: 5). Patton rightly makes this activity of concept
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creation the first explicit focus of his book, since it not only provides the
viewpoint through which he presents Deleuze’s thought, but also the basis upon
which he undertakes his own revisionary project. ‘A guiding principle of this
study’, he writes, ‘is that Deleuze’s contribution to political thought must be
assessed in relation to his own concept and practice of philosophy’ (Patton 2000:
2). The first chapter (‘Concept and image of thought: Deleuze’s conception of
philosophy’) thus opens with an examination of the political concept of the
‘social contract’, which Patton uses to illustrate the various aspects by which
Deleuze and Guattari define a concept: its intensive 
 
components
 
, which in turn
constitute concepts in their own right (e.g. the state of nature; the restless desire
for power; the artificial person that results from the contract); its internal
 
consistency
 
 (the way these elements are linked together internally; the ‘endo-
consistency’ of the concept); its 
 
plane of immanence
 
 (the way the concept of the
social contract links up externally with related concepts such as sovereignty,
legitimation, justice, etc.; the ‘exo-consistency’ of concepts). Surprisingly,
Patton does not discuss the crucial Deleuzian notion of 
 
conceptual personae
 
,
which in the context of political philosophy might include the Leviathan, the
Noble Savage, the Prince and so on (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 63). The
 
critique
 
 of a concept can take place at any of these levels: one can add, subtract or
transform the components, or alter the relations between them. For instance, in
Locke’s version of the social contract, subjects are no longer determined by the
desire for power, as in Hobbes, but rather by their ownership of property – a
change in components – which in turn implies obligations towards oneself and
others – a change in consistency. This is a good example of the transformative
process through which concepts can be rejuvenated and renewed throughout
history, and it lies at the basis of Patton’s own project to reinterpret liberal
concepts from a Deleuzian perspective. Finally, Patton emphasizes the fact that,
in all these aspects, concepts always derive their necessity from historically
determined 
 
problematics 
 
(Patton 2000: 21). Whereas Hobbes’ problematic was
the constitution and legitimation of civil authority, for instance, John Rawls’
problematic in 
 
A Theory of Justice
 
 (1971) concerns the principles of a just
society, in the context of which Rawls himself would take up and transform the
concept of the social contract yet again (Patton 2000: 13).
This analysis, though scarcely three pages long, is a 
 
tour de force
 
, and provides
a far more accessible example of conceptual analysis than the one Deleuze and
Guattari themselves provide in 
 
What is Philosophy?
 
 (via the somewhat obscure
Deleuzian concept of the 
 
autrui
 
) (see Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16–19). It
plays a double role in the context of Patton’s study: it allows him to summarize
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of concepts, while at the same time
providing us with a capsule history of one of the founding concepts of the liberal
tradition of political philosophy. It immediately leads us to the second explicit
aim of the book, the one that concerns us, which is to show ‘the points of
connection’ between Deleuze’s work and the Anglo-American tradition of polit-
ical philosophy (Patton 2000: 135). This, however, raises a preliminary but
necessary question: w
 
hy
 
 did Deleuze himself largely ignore the political
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concepts of the liberal tradition such as the social contract? The reason for this
evasion, Patton suggests, can be found in a fundamental shift in the status of the
subject that is effected in Deleuze’s philosophy. The general question posed by
the theory of the social contract is: how can individuals enter into a mutually
beneficial political alliance? In this sense, the social contract presupposes the
prior existence of already constituted individuals as political subjects. In
Deleuze, by contrast, the subject itself becomes a secondary phenomenon, the
product or the ‘effect’ of more primary sets of flows or 
 
processes
 
 (what Foucault
called ‘processes of subjectivation’). The political questions Deleuze asks are
therefore always posed at the level of 
 
pre-subjective
 
 processes. For example: how
is it that desire, as a process, can come to desire its own repression? How can a
subjective (though abstract) process such as labor be ‘captured’ by institutions
or state apparatuses? The political philosophy developed in 
 
Capitalism and
Schizophrenia
 
 attempts to analyze social formations primarily as physical
systems defined in terms of their processes – or, more precisely, in terms of a
generalized theory of ‘flows’ (
 
flux
 
): flows of matter, flows of population and
commodities, flows of capital and labor, flows of traffic, flows of knowledge,
flows of desire and so on. Simplifying to the extreme, one could say that Deleuze
is not a philosopher of the subject but a philosopher of pre-subjective processes
or flows. This is the fundamental metaphysical shift in Deleuze’s philosophy,
and it is these processes that Deleuze’s concepts attempt to describe.
The task Patton takes on, then, is to show if and how liberal political concepts
can be retained and transformed in light of this metaphysical shift. In turn, the
possibility of such a transformation, he suggests, must itself rest on Deleuze’s
own analytic of concepts, and on the ‘cognitive function’ Deleuze assigns to
them (Patton 2000: 26). On this score, Patton emphasizes the definition,
provided in 
 
What is Philosophy?
 
,
 
 
 
that philosophical concepts ‘provide knowledge
of pure events’ (Patton 2000: 26). But what is a ‘pure event’? Deleuze distin-
guishes between the actualization of an event in a state of affairs or in lived
experience, that is, in 
 
history
 
, and the pure event, which is irreducible to its
actualizations, ‘the event in its 
 
becoming
 
, in its specific consistency’, which
escapes history and is ‘utopic’, both now-here and no-where (a play on Samuel
Butler’s utopian neologism 
 
Erewhon
 
), and is expressed in a ‘self-positing
concept’ (Patton 2000: 27). As an example of this distinction, Patton points to
Kant’s famous reflections on the French Revolution in 
 
The Contest of the Facul-
ties
 
, a text that has recently been taken up by thinkers as diverse as Foucault,
Habermas and Lyotard. Kant distinguished between ‘the concept of a revolu-
tion in favor of the universal rights of man as this was expressed in the “enthu-
siasm” of Europeans for those ideals’ (this is what marks their ‘becoming’ in
relation to the concept) and ‘the manner in which that concept and those ideals
were actualized in the bloody events of 1789’ (this is ‘history’) (Patton 2000: 27).
Patton reformulates this Kantian distinction (between spectator and actor) into
a Deleuzian one (between an event and a state of affairs), showing how political
concepts such as ‘revolution’ (considered as a kind of ‘territoriality’) have a
double structure: on the one hand, there is the concept insofar as it is actualized
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in or refers to a particular state of affairs (e.g. the actual events of 1789) where it
effects movements of 
 
relative 
 
deterritorialization, movements that can be
blocked or reterritorialized (the ‘betrayal’ of the revolution, its inevitable disap-
pointment); on the other hand, there is the concept insofar as it expresses a ‘pure
event’ that posits revolution as an 
 
absolute 
 
deterritorialization, a self-referential
movement of pure immanence, a ‘pure reserve’ that is never exhausted by its
various actualizations (Patton 2000: 97, 107, 136). Deleuze uses the term 
 
utopia
 
to designate the ‘critical point’ at which these two aspects of the concept are
brought together: the point where the absolute deterritorialization expressed by
the concept is connected with the present relative milieu. ‘To say that revolution
is itself utopia of immanence’, write Deleuze and Guattari, ‘is to posit revolution
as plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey, but to the extent
that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the struggle
against capitalism, relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is
betrayed’ (1994: 100).
It is this event-based theory of the concept that Patton puts to work in his
revision of liberal political concepts. His method is to extract the ‘pure event’ of
a liberal concept in order to, at the same time, reinject it into the current
situation and thereby effect its transformation. ‘Remarkable or interesting
concepts’, Patton writes, ‘are those that can be taken up again and again in new
circumstances, continuing to work their subversive way through history’ (2000:
133). This might appear to be a curious conception of the political, which is here
defined in terms of one’s relation to a concept or Idea rather than in terms of
one’s relation to a concrete state of affairs or a political situation. In Kant, for
example, the ‘enthusiasm’ of the Europeans, their becoming-revolutionary, is
explicitly linked, not to the historical revolution as it unfolded before them in
France, but rather to its 
 
concept
 
, that is, to a ‘pure event’, almost as if the
revolution itself were something secondary. But, as Hannah Arendt suggests in
her 
 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy
 
, this is a definition of what political
 
philosophy
 
 is: ‘Robert Cumming recently wrote that “the subject matter of
modern political philosophy . . . is not the polis or politics, but the relation
between philosophy and politics.” This remark actually applies to all political
philosophy and, most of all, to its beginnings in Athens’ (Arendt 1982: 22). Such
seems to be the case with Deleuze: ‘The word “utopia” designates 
 
that conjunc-
tion of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu –
 
 political philosophy’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 100). Using Deleuze’s own methodology, then,
Patton’s proposal is to treat certain liberal concepts (normativity, freedom,
judgement) as ‘pure events’ in this Deleuzian sense – utopian concepts that are
irreducible to their various actualizations, whether in a state of affairs or a
particular political theory, and hence are themselves capable of transformation
in connection with changing historical problematics.
This methodological approach, however, raises a delicate problem that Patton
does not discuss directly, although it is implicit in his entire project: the possi-
bility of what one might call 
 
exhausted 
 
concepts. If certain concepts can be taken
up again and transformed within philosophy (e.g. the social contract in Hobbes,
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Locke, Rawls), it is because what the concept expresses (the ‘pure event’) is
irreducible to its actualizations (for instance, Patton argues that the concept of
the social contract, as an expression of absolute deterritorialization, ‘can be
regarded as an expression of the pure and indeterminate event of a political
system based upon equality before the law’ (2000: 28)). But do some concepts,
even as pure events, eventually become ‘exhausted’? Deleuze suggests that the
concept of ‘truth’ is itself so under- (or over-) determined in philosophy that the
problematic to which it corresponds must always be carefully delineated (see, for
example, Deleuze, 1994: 158–9). Elsewhere he and Guattari write, in a similar
vein, that ‘reason is only a concept, and a very impoverished concept’ at that
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994). If Deleuze tended to ignore liberal concepts, or
even certain Marxist concepts, was it because he deemed that such concepts had
become exhausted, or were no longer relevant to contemporary problematics?
Moreover, is this not why Deleuze defines philosophy as the creation of 
 
new
 
concepts – new concepts that would constitute a response to changing condi-
tions? Put simply, how does one assess the difference between the need to create
a 
 
new 
 
concept in philosophy and the possibility of reactivating or transforming
an 
 
already existing
 
 concept? 
One can raise this question already knowing, at least in principle, the inevi-
table response: there can be no pre-existent criteria to determine the direction a
philosopher should take, which is why Deleuze constantly insists on the neces-
sity of 
 
experimentation
 
. But, in practice, this is a difficult question and complex
question, which has given rise to some well-known and dramatic passages in the
history of philosophy. In the 
 
Critique of Pure Reason
 
, for instance, Kant takes
care to carefully explain his appropriation of the Platonic concept of the ‘Idea’,
even as he introduces significant changes into the concept (1929: A312/
B368ff.). Likewise, in 
 
A Theory of Justice
 
, Rawls is compelled to justify his own
retention of the terminology of the social contract in the context of his theory of
‘justice as fairness’ (1971: 16), just as Heidegger takes care to explain his reten-
tion of the traditional concept of the ‘understanding’ in 
 
Being and Time
 
 even as
he dramatically reconfigures it as a fundamental 
 
existential
 
 of Dasein (1962:
H143–5). A similar drama is at work in Patton’s book. Patton is not simply
writing as a commentator, offering a generalized criticism of Deleuze’s rejection
of liberal political concepts. More subtly, he is writing as a philosopher,
suggesting that Deleuze’s philosophy can and should be re-evaluated in light of
our contemporary historical situation and changing philosophical problematics.
What light would the liberal concepts that Deleuze ignores shed on Deleuze’s
own political philosophy? Conversely, what kind of transformations could
Deleuze’s concepts introduce into the liberal tradition, given its current situa-
tion? In short, what kind of ‘becoming’ would liberal and Deleuzian concepts
enter into when they are brought into contact with each other? The fact is that
one can never know in advance the course of the becoming of a given concept.
As Deleuze writes, ‘it’s not a matter of bringing all sorts of things under a single
concept, but rather of relating each concept to the variables that explain its
mutations’ (1995b: 31).
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Deleuze’s analytic of concepts, in short, can only be worked out experimen-
tally, and in this case the experimentation is carried out on several ‘liberal’
concepts that Patton, somewhat surreptitiously, imports into his analyses of
Deleuze: normativity, freedom and judgement (as well as a non-liberal concept,
the social imaginary). This experimental confrontation is not heralded loudly,
but is pursued quietly and patiently throughout the entire book. In the sections
that follow, I should simply like to explore, in a provisional manner, how Patton
transforms each of these concepts experimentally in the course of his analyses,
in a way that points to a new understanding of the liberal tradition of political
philosophy.
 
Normativity and the condition of the ‘new’
 
The first liberal notion Patton makes use of in his reading of Deleuze is the
concept of 
 
normativity
 
. Though the term is not listed in the index, it appears
frequently in the third section of the chapter on power.
 
3
 
 One of Patton’s tasks in
these two central chapters – on ‘Power’ and ‘Desire’ – is to argue (persuasively,
in my view) that Deleuze’s theory of desire can be brought together with the
theory of power one finds in Foucault and Nietzsche, despite certain conceptual
differences. The discussion of normativity that occurs in this context, however,
touches a much more difficult question, one that lies at the heart of several
recent debates in political philosophy. Critics such as Nancy Fraser and Jürgen
Habermas, for instance, have argued that Michel Foucault’s well-known theory
of power is entirely ‘non-normative’ (Patton 2000: 59). Normativity is itself a
somewhat overdetermined philosophical concept, one that corresponds to the
question, ‘What is the source of the authority that moral considerations have
over us?’ It is usually contrasted with the descriptive, as ‘ought’ is contrasted
with ‘is’. When Habermas and Fraser critique Foucault for failing to provide
normative criteria for discriminating between different 
 
ways
 
 of exercising
power, they are therefore accusing Foucault of failing to answer one of the
central concerns of liberal political theory and the social contract tradition,
namely, ‘When and in what ways is power, especially State power, justified?’
(Patton 2000: 59).
Patton attempts to respond to such criticisms from a Deleuzian perspective.
‘Unlike Foucault’s analytic of power’, he writes, Deleuze’s approach to power is
‘
 
explicitly normative
 
’ (Patton 2000: 65, 49). This is a somewhat surprising claim,
since Deleuze is often condemned along with Foucault for neglecting (or
avoiding, or refusing) questions of normativity. Indeed, one could imagine two
possible Deleuzian responses to the criticisms of non-normativity. One might
ask if normativity is a good or rigorous concept, and proceed to criticize the
concept from a Deleuzian viewpoint. In this case, one could argue that Foucault
and Deleuze do not address issues of normativity because their work entails a
critique of the very notion of normativity. Patton, however, follows the opposite
approach. He takes the problem of normativity seriously, and argues that,
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despite appearances, one can find an explicit normative criterion in Deleuze’s
work, which he identifies by name: ‘The overriding norm is that of deterritori-
alization’ (Patton 2000: 9). This is the third key thesis of 
 
Deleuze and the
Political
 
: ‘A central claim of the present study is that it is the concept of
“deterritorialization” which bears the weight of the utopian vocation which
Deleuze and Guattari attribute to philosophy’ (Patton 2000: 9). In what sense,
then, does Deleuze’s notion of deterritorialization play the role of a normative
concept?
If Deleuze’s political philosophy effects a shift from subjects to processes,
then the concept of normativity would have to be altered accordingly. According
to Patton, this is exactly what occurs in Deleuze’s work: it is the concept of
deterritorialization that provides ‘a normative framework within which to
describe and evaluate movements or processes’ (Patton 2000: 136). For Deleuze,
to analyze a social formation is to unravel the variable lines and singular 
 
processes
 
that constitute it as a multiplicity: their connections and disjunctions, their
circuits and short-circuits and, above all, their possible transformations. To
introduce elements of transcendence into the analysis of such fields of imman-
ence, says Deleuze, it is enough to introduce ‘universals’ that would serve as
constant co-ordinates for these processes, and effectively ‘stop their movement’
(see Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 47; Deleuze 1995b: 85, 145–6). Deleuze
constantly insists that universals are abstractions that explain nothing; they are
rather what need to be explained. For instance, there is no such thing as a ‘pure
reason’ or a universal rationality, but rather a plurality of heterogeneous
‘processes of rationalization’ of the kind analyzed by Alexandre Koyré, Gaston
Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem in the field of epistemology, Max Weber in
sociology and François Châtelet in philosophy. Likewise, there is no universal or
transcendental Subject, which could function as the bearer of universal human
rights, but only variable and historically diverse ‘processes of subjectivation’, to
use Foucault’s term (Deleuze 1988a: 14–17, 1992: 162). What one finds in any
given socio-political assemblage is not a universal ‘Reason’, but variable
processes of rationalization; not universalizable ‘subjects’, but variable processes
of subjectivation; not the ‘whole’, the ‘one’ or ‘objects’, but rather knots of
totalization, focuses of unification, and processes of objectification. Such
processes operate within concrete multiplicities, and are relative to them, and
thus need to be analyzed on their own account.
Deleuze would no doubt have followed the same approach in his analysis of
normativity had he addressed the issue directly. Foucault himself spoke of the
power of what he called the process of 
 
normalization
 
, which creates us, as
subjects, in terms of existing force relations and existing ‘norms’. For Foucault,
normalization is not merely an abstract principle of adjudication but an already
actualized (and always actualized) power relation. Foucault’s question then
became: is it possible to escape, or at least 
 
resist
 
, this power of normalization? In
Deleuze’s terminology, the same question would be stated in the following
terms: within a given social assemblage or ‘territoriality’, where can one find the
‘line of flight’, or the movement of relative deterritorialization, by means of
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which one can escape from or transform the existing norm (or territoriality)?
From this viewpoint, neither Foucault nor Deleuze avoid the issue of norma-
tivity, they simply analyze it in terms of an 
 
immanent process
 
. The error of
transcendence would be to posit normative criteria as abstract universals, even if
these are defined in intersubjective or communicative terms. From the view-
point of immanence, by contrast, it is the process itself that must account for
 
both
 
 the production of the norm as well as its possible destruction or alteration.
In a given assemblage, one will indeed find normative criteria that govern, for
instance, the application of the power of the State, but one will also find the
means for the critique and modification of those norms, their deterritorializa-
tion. A truly ‘normative’ principle must not only provide norms for condemning
abuses of power, but also a means for condemning norms that have themselves
become abuses of power (e.g. the norms that governed the treatment of women,
slaves, minorities, etc.). An immanent process, in other words, must, at one and
the same time, function as a principle of 
 
critique
 
 as well as a principle of 
 
creation
 
(the ‘genetic’ method). ‘The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are
one and the same’ (Deleuze 1994: 139). The one cannot and ‘must’ not exist
without the other.
If deterritorialization functions as a norm for Patton, then, it is a somewhat
paradoxical norm. Within any assemblage, what is normative is deterritorializa-
tion, that is, the creation of ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze) or ‘resistance’ (Foucault)
that allow one to break free from a given norm, or to transform the norm. What
‘must’ always remain normative is the ability to critique and transform existing
norms, that is, to create something 
 
new
 
 (the category of the new should be
understood here in the broad sense, including not only social change, but also
artistic creation, conceptual innovation and so on.) One cannot have pre-existing
norms or criteria for the new; otherwise it would not be new, but already
foreseen. This is the basis on which Patton argues that Deleuze’s conception of
power is explicitly normative: ‘What a given assemblage is capable of doing or
becoming’, he writes, ‘is determined by the lines of flight or deterritorialization
which it can sustain’ (Patton 2000: 106).
(One might note here that the concept of ‘nomadic war-machines’, which was
introduced in 
 
A Thousand Plateaus
 
, is Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to address
the question of a social formation that would itself be constructed along such
movements or lines of flight. Patton suggests that such assemblages should in
fact be called ‘metamorphosis’ machines (2000: 110), since they have only an
external relation to war and a historically contingent relation to nomads; this is a
suggestion that will no doubt be taken up by others.
Metamorphosis machines would be the conditions of actualization of absolute
deterritorialization and the means by which relative deterritorialization
occurs: ‘They bring 
 
connections
 
 to bear against the great 
 
conjunction
 
 of the
apparatuses of capture or domination.’ . . . A metamorphosis machine would
then be one that . . . engenders the production of something altogether
different.
(Patton 2000: 110)
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Patton is therefore using the concept ‘normativity’ in a quite different manner
than Fraser or Habermas. They would say that deterritorialization is not norma-
tive, and cannot be, since it eludes any universal criteria and indeed allows for
their modification. Patton in effect responds by saying: for that very reason, it is
deterritorialization that should be seen as a normative concept, even if that
entails a new concept of what normativity is. At one point in 
 
Difference and
Repetition
 
, Deleuze writes that ‘one can conserve the word essence, if one
wishes, but only on the condition of saying that essence is precisely the accident
or the event’ (1994: 191). Patton seems to be saying something similar: one can
conserve the word normativity, if one wishes, but only on the condition of
saying that the normative is the new or the deterritorialized. Patton’s own
trajectory is thus beginning to come into focus: rather than simply dropping or
ignoring the concept of normativity, he instead proposes to create a new concept
of normativity by critiquing components of the old one, and linking it up with a
quite different set of related concepts. In this manner, he is effecting a transfor-
mation of the liberal concept, while still attempting to situate his own work fully
within the liberal tradition.
 
The concept of ‘critical freedom’
 
A second concept Patton incorporates into his analyses of Deleuze, and links to
the concept of normativity, is the concept of 
 
freedom
 
, even though Deleuze
himself rarely uses this term in his writings (Guattari is said to have remarked
that he disliked words that, in French, end with an accent: 
 
verité
 
, 
 
liberté
 
, 
 
taraté
taraté. . . .
 
).
 
4
 
 Patton nonetheless entitles his fourth chapter ‘Desire, becoming,
and freedom’, and goes so far as to describe Deleuze’s thought as an ‘ethics of
freedom’ (Patton 2000: 83). In characterizing Deleuze’s philosophy from the
viewpoint of a concept that is foreign to Deleuze’s own thought, Patton is in fact
utilizing a strategy that is itself Deleuzian. In his books on Spinoza, for instance,
Deleuze claims that the concept of univocity is ‘the keystone of Spinoza’s entire
philosophy’ (Deleuze 1988b: 63), even though the term ‘univocity’ does not
appear even once in Spinoza’s texts. The effect of such a technique, however, is
to produce what at one point Deleuze calls a ‘double becoming’ (1989: 221, 222):
the introduction of a foreign concept can often serve as a prism or point of
reference by which to evaluate the movement of thought of a given thinker,
while at the same time the concept itself is transformed, and enters into its own
becoming. (It nonetheless remains an interesting question to ask why Deleuze
might have avoided concepts such as normativity and freedom, while freely
adopting other highly charged philosophical concepts such as ‘idea’ or
‘essence’.)
How is the concept of freedom transformed when it is brought into contact
with Deleuze’s thought? What Patton finds in Deleuze’s work is an activity of
what he calls ‘critical freedom’ – a term developed by James Tully in his book
 
Strange Multiplicity
 
 (1995) – which he distinguishes from the notions of negative
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and positive freedom. 
 
Negative freedom
 
, as formulated by Isaiah Berlin in his
canonical essay ‘Two concepts of freedom’, is one of the concepts that lie at the
heart of the modern liberal tradition. It defines freedom negatively as ‘the
absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities’ (Berlin 1969), an ‘area of
non-interference’ in which agents are allowed to pursue their desires and goals
freely without having their choices limited by the intervention of others. By
contrast, the concept of 
 
positive freedom
 
, as championed by Charles Taylor
(1985), implies the stronger notion of ‘self-mastery’ or ‘strong evaluation’, that
is, the idea of actively ‘exercising control over one’s life’ by evaluating and
defining one’s own desires and goals (Patton 2000: 84). Berlin sees positive
freedom as a threat to liberty because it implies that subjects will be constrained
to act in prescribed manners; Taylor insists that our freedom of choice is always
already partly limited and prescribed by our milieu, and that one evaluates and
chooses only within the context of that milieu (culture, community, the state
and its laws, and so on).
What both these notions of freedom share, however, is a conception of the
subject as a determinate structure of interests, goals and desires: the freedom of
the subject lies in its ability to act in pursuit of these interests and goals. What
they overlook, or underemphasize, Patton argues, is the fact that individuals
often 
 
distance
 
 themselves from their initial (or inherited) preferences and 
 
alter
 
them in fundamental ways (Patton 2000: 84). This may happen at an individual
level (e.g. a person altering or leaving a religious heritage) or in a social context
where one is exposed to alternative ways of thinking and living (e.g. exposure to
feminist or racial critiques, contact with other cultures or minorities within
one’s own culture and so on). Such transformations presume a capacity to alter
one’s thought and actions, to ‘question in thought and challenge in practice
one’s inherited cultural ways’ (Patton 2000: 85), and it is this capacity that Tully
terms ‘critical freedom’. It is the freedom to critique, the freedom to be trans-
formed, to be changed. It entails, as Foucault said, the ability to ‘think other-
wise’ (1985: 8), or, as Deleuze might say, the capacity of the self to 
 
affect 
 
itself.
Patton’s proposal here is to align Deleuze with Tully’s contribution to liberal
political thought, and to assign to critical freedom a ‘normative’ status.
But how then does Patton position this notion of critical freedom within
Deleuze’s thought? Deleuze in fact is not completely silent with regard to the
liberal tradition. In 
 
A Thousand Plateaus
 
, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to show
how, within the liberal tradition itself, the notion of the freedom of 
 
subjects
 
 is
inevitably tied to an ‘image of thought’ derived from the 
 
State
 
. Social contract
theory, in their analysis, operates between two poles, the subject and the legis-
lator: as a subject I give up my freedom to the State in return for protection from
others and from the state of nature (the State as an ‘agent of servitude’); in
return for this servitude the State, as legislator, affords me the greatest possible
scope of liberty (the State as the locus of negative freedom). In Kant’s hands,
however, this link
 
 
 
between subject and legislator would be pushed to its limit in
the notion of a subject that is subjected 
 
only to itself
 
 as a self-legislating rational
being (‘autonomy’): ‘The contract must be pushed to the extreme; in other
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words, it is no longer concluded between two people but between self and self,
within the same person – 
 
Ich
 
 = 
 
Ich
 
 – as subjected and sovereign’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987: 460). In the Kantian formulation, freedom becomes defined as
the 
 
identity
 
 of subject and legislator in the same person. ‘The more you obey [as
subject], the more you will be master [as legislator], for you will only be obeying
pure reason . . . in other words, 
 
yourself
 
’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 376).
What one finds here is a mysterious ‘nexum’ between the subject, the State and
reason, which perhaps reached its apotheosis in certain forms of Hegelianism:
reason invents the fiction of a State that is universal by right, it elevates the State
to a 
 
de jure
 
 rationality, such that realized reason is identified with the 
 
de jure
 
State and the State is the becoming of reason itself (the particularity of States
being a mere accident of fact); the State in turn provides thought itself with a
model (the republic of free and rational minds, a 
 
cogitatio universalis
 
) which is
internalized in the self as both legislator and subject (under formal conditions
that allows thought to conceptualize their identity) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:
375–6, 556, note 42).
Now, if Deleuze’s own philosophy breaks with this nexus, then any reformu-
lation of the concept of freedom in Deleuzian terms would have to operate, not
at the level of subjects or the State, but rather at the level of their genetic
processes (subjectivation, statification, rationalization). As Patton shows, this is
indeed the case in one of the few texts in which Deleuze actually uses the term
(Patton 2000: 41–2). In 
 
Difference and Repetition
 
, Deleuze writes that the ‘differ-
ential object’ of sociability cannot be lived with actual societies, but ‘must be and
can only be lived in the element of social upheaval (in other words, 
 
freedom,
which is always hidden among the remains of the old order and the first fruits of
a new)’ (1994: 193). Here, freedom is not equated with the liberty to move about
and pursue one’s interests within a given social formation or State; rather, it
concerns the conditions of change for the social structure itself. (In A Thousand
Plateaus, it is the war-machine that will come to play this role, in contradistinc-
tion to the State.) Already in Difference and Repetition, then, Deleuze was giving
the concept of freedom an altered set of components, making it correspond to
one of the fundamental problems of his philosophy, namely, the conditions for
the production of the new. (This is a different question from that of the condi-
tions of change, since the new, in order to be truly new, can be neither foresee-
able nor conceptualizable nor even expected or hoped for.) Freedom, as a
condition of the new, appears here as a limit concept (or Idea) in a far more
radical sense than one finds even in Kant.
When Patton parses this limit notion of freedom, he does so in terms of
Deleuze’s distinction between the connection and the conjugation of processes
(Patton 2000: 101–2). This distinction is a difficult and nuanced one in
Deleuze’s philosophy, but Patton argues that it functions as an immanent
normative criterion for evaluating the modes of interaction between processes or
flows. A conjunction of flows occurs when one flow blocks or constrains other
flows, in such a manner that it brings the latter under the dominance of a single
flow capable of ‘overcoding’ them (hence Deleuze and Guattari’s use of
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terminology such as ‘capture’, ‘integration’, ‘sedimentation’, ‘stratification’ and
so on). By contrast, a connection occurs when two flows enter into relation in
such a manner that something passes between them, and their interaction
produces something new which introduces a real transformation in a given field.
This third thing is what Deleuze terms a ‘becoming’ (see Deleuze and Guattari
1987: 232–309), and Patton rightly characterizes Deleuze’s philosophy of the
new (or ‘ethics of freedom’) as a politics of becoming. But he also stresses the
complexities and uncertainties involved in such a politics.
Whereas the normative status and the value of liberal freedom is straightfor-
wardly positive, critical freedom is a much more ambivalent and risky affair:
more ambivalent, since it involves leaving behind existing grounds of value,
with the result that it is not always clear whether it is good or bad; risky,
because there is no telling in advance where such processes of mutation and
change might lead, whether at the level of individual or collective assem-
blages.
 (Patton 2000: 87)
This is a succinct statement of Patton’s revised concepts of normativity and
critical freedom, and of the ‘exo-consistency’ he is attempting to establish
between them. Here, again, one can get a clear sense of the conceptual apparatus
Patton is in the process of creating, step by step, in the midst of his commentary
on Deleuze.
The theory of judgment in Deleuze
The third foreign term Patton brings into his analyses, although only in passing,
is the term judgement. At one point, he describes Nietzsche’s thought as ‘a
complex and nuanced system of judgment’ (Patton 2000: 63) – a phrase that
brought me up short, since one of Deleuze’s most persistent themes is the need
‘to have done with judgement’ (a formula derived from Artaud, though Deleuze
assigns it a much broader scope). Deleuze prefers the term ‘evaluation’ to
‘judgement’, and constantly criticizes what he, following Nietzsche, calls ‘the
system of judgement’ in philosophy. My initial reaction was that Patton’s use of
the word was simply infelicitous, but, the more I read, the more it became clear
that Patton’s positive appeal to a theory of judgement was not incidental. Why is
Deleuze ‘against’ judgement? Judgement is the act of subsuming the particular
under the general, and Deleuze is clearly critical of the notion of the general or
the universal. Universals explain nothing, Deleuze constantly says, but are
themselves what need to be explained (see, e.g., Deleuze and Parnet 1987: vii),
and Patton likewise insists that there neither is nor can be any ‘transcendent
point or uniform standard of judgment’ (Patton 2000: 64).
But does this mean we must have done with the concept of judgement as
such? Kant himself, for instance, in the Critique of Judgement, developed the rich
notion of reflective judgements – judgements that start with the particular and
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look for the general, which is not given but merely has a ‘problematic’ status.5
Thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard and Hannah Arendt have demon-
strated the importance of the notion of reflective judgement for political philos-
ophy. Deleuze’s own distinction between the regular and the singular is
germane here: the regular is that which is submitted to a general rule, which is
regulated, but the singular is that which lies outside the rule. But is not this what
we mean when we speak of ‘sound’ judgement: the ability to act when there is no
clear rule? This is a point that Arendt makes in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem:
A Report on the Banality of Evil. What we expected, or at least hoped, of people
in situations like that of Nazi Germany, she says, was: 
that human beings be capable of telling right from wrong even when all they
have to guide them is their own judgment, which, moreover, happens to be
completely at odds with what they must regard as the unanimous opinion of
all those around them. . . . Those few who still were able to tell right from
wrong went really only by their own judgments, and they did so freely [in an
act of what Patton would call ‘critical freedom’]; there were no rules to be
abided by, under which the particular cases with which they were confronted
could be subsumed. They had to decide each instance as it arose, because no
rules existed for the unprecedented.
 (Arendt 1965: 294–5)
In his concluding chapter on native title entitled ‘Nomads, capture, and
colonization’, Patton seems to follow a trajectory similar to Arendt’s. For
Deleuze, the law is a kind of axiomatic system: laws or rights (such as human
rights) are axioms from which certain theorems are deduced (e.g. torture is a
violation of my rights). But undecidability is inherent in every axiomatic system:
undecidable cases are what wind up in the courts, before a judge, who in the end
must make a judgement in the absence of any rule (if there was a clear rule the
case would not wind up in court). The decision then enters the body of law as a
precedent, as a singularity. The law thus operates on two registers: legislators
create laws and decide on axioms, rules; while the judiciary (common law)
moves from case to case, from singularity to singularity; it is a prolongation of
singularities. The landmark 1991 Mabo case of the Australian High Court,
which first affirmed that native or aboriginal title formed part of Australian
common law, is such a singularity, and Patton analyzes the case in Deleuzian
terms: it was not simply a deterritorialization of the State’s legal mechanism of
capture, but the creation of a kind of ‘zone of indiscernibility’ between
indigenous law and the common law (Patton 2000: 128–9), a kind of ‘jurispru-
dential smooth space’ (Patton 2000: 31) which has had and will continue to have
profound ‘prolongations’. But Patton’s analyses lead to the following question:
is not the Mabo decision itself the result of an act of judgement? Deleuze himself
says that ‘it is jurisprudence which is truly creative of rights’ (Patton 2000: 3,
120), it is a potential space of metamorphosis. Why then does Deleuze want to
have done with judgement? In jurisprudence, is it not an act of judgement that
creates rights? Is not judgement operative at the level of both ‘court decisions’
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and ‘legislative enactments’? Is it not therefore possible to retain a concept of
judgement (freed from the universal) when one speaks of the creation of rights
in jurisprudence? Patton’s analyses seem to point in this direction. Moreover,
one can see how such a concept of judgement would link up with the other
‘liberal’ concepts introduced by Patton: (1) deterritorialization is indeed ‘norma-
tive’ because (2) it opens up a space of ‘critical freedom’ within which (3) one can
exercise a judgement, outside pre-existing rules, that would be truly creative
and productive of the new (e.g. new rights).
Patton’s analyses of native title in Australia and of the creative role Deleuze
assigns to jurisprudence is, in my opinion, one of the most original sections of
Deleuze and the Political (2000: 120–31), since it addresses the concept that
perhaps lies at the heart of the liberal tradition, namely, the concept of rights. Yet
again, this is a concept Deleuze rarely discusses, and, when he does, he is
surprisingly critical of the very notion of human rights (or in French, les droits de
homme, the universal ‘rights of man’). ‘The reverence people display toward
human rights’, Deleuze muses in the 1988–9 Abécédaire interview, ‘almost
makes one want to defend horrible, terrible positions’ (Deleuze 1995a: G).
Deleuze’s critique, however, is directed less against the concept of rights per se
than against the universal status accorded to human rights, which turns it into a
‘pure abstraction’, an ‘empty’ concept, to the point where Deleuze can even
speak of the ‘mystifications of human rights’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 225,
note 18). In Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, human rights are not univer-
sals but axioms, and they coexist within the capitalist market with other axioms
– notably the axiom of the security of property, which will often simply ignore
or suspend human rights. ‘What social democracy has not given the order to fire
when the poor come out of their territory or ghetto?’ (Deleuze and Guattari
1994: 107). Moreover, as Alain Badiou has remarked, axioms such as human
rights do not concern individuals directly, in their concrete multiplicity, but
only insofar as this multiplicity is reduced to a ‘one’ that can be counted (the
individual who votes, who is imprisoned, who contributes to Social Security,
etc.) (Badiou 1991: 39–57). In other words, ‘human rights say nothing about the
immanent modes of existence of the people provided with rights’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994: 107).
In the Abécédaire interview, Deleuze points to the example of the then-
unfolding situation in Armenia: Armenians living in an enclave in a Soviet
Republic had been massacred by Turks; the survivors escaped into the
Armenian republic, where they were almost immediately devastated by a
tremendous earthquake. ‘It’s like something out of the Marquis de Sade. These
poor people have gone through the worst ordeals they could face, and they
barely escape into shelter when nature starts it all up again’ (Deleuze 1995a: G).
It is not sufficient, Deleuze continues, to insist that the Turks had no right to
massacre the Armenians or that they violated the Armenians’ rights. The abom-
inations the Armenians suffered are not denials of abstract rights; they are cases,
abominable cases, singular cases (even if such cases often resemble each other).
In this case, what is at issue is a specific case of territorial organization, that is,
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an enclave in a Soviet Republic, surrounded by hostile Turks. How can the
enclave be eliminated, or made livable? What can be done to enable the
Armenians to extricate themselves from this situation, so they are no longer
simply delivered into the hands of the Turks? The earthquake raised different
questions concerning, for instance, the unsuitable construction of buildings.
What is needed in each of these instances is not an application of universal
rights, but rather the invention of jurisprudences so that, in each case, this or
that will no longer be possible. Those are two quite different procedures. As
Deleuze says, ‘there are no ‘rights of man’, there is life, and there are rights of
life. Only life proceeds case by case’ (Deleuze 1995a: G).
Deleuze is here simply following the trajectory laid out above: universal co-
ordinates such as ‘rights’ explain nothing; what need to be analyzed in a concrete
assemblage are the processes by which rights are both created and critiqued.
Hence the importance of jurisprudence: it provides Deleuze with a model for
the creation of rights that are not universal, but always linked to a given assem-
blage and the particularity of specific cases or singularities. In the Abécédaire
interview, Deleuze also provides a more quotidian example. In the late 1970s, a
taxi driver was successfully prosecuted in Paris for prohibiting passengers from
smoking in his taxi. The pretext for the decision: a passenger in a taxi is like a
tenant in an apartment. Tenants are allowed to smoke in their apartment under
the right of use; taxis are like mobile apartments that passengers occupy as
temporary tenants; therefore when someone takes a taxi they are considered to
be a tenant and must be allowed to smoke. By the late 1980s, smoking was
prohibited in every Parisian taxi, because taking a taxi was no longer equated
with renting a private apartment, but was considered to be a public service, and
it was legitimate to prohibit smoking in public areas. Such is the process of
jurisprudence: it is not a question of universal rights; it is a question of a
situation, and a situation that is evolving. ‘To act for freedom, to become a
revolutionary’, Deleuze says, ‘is to act on a plane of jurisprudence’ (1995a: G).
This is the precise path Patton follows in his analyses of native title, and the
implications of landmark decisions such as Mabo in Australia and Calder in
Canada (Patton 2000: 127–31). ‘We should not be too quick to discount the
deterritorializing power of new rights’, writes Patton. ‘Rights too are virtual
singularities, the consequences of which are only actualized in specific court
decisions, legislative enactments and the interactions between these’ (2000:
127).
And yet, despite his appeal to the process of jurisprudence, it remains note-
worthy that Deleuze never offered a concomitant concept of judgement. Given
his own theory of the concept, it would seemingly have been possible for
Deleuze to retain the notion of judgement simply by altering the components of
the concept, and Patton’s analyses hint strongly at this possibility. Why then did
Deleuze himself decline to take this path – a path that had been charted out by
Arendt and Lyotard in their appeals to ‘reflective judgement’? This question
perhaps takes us to the heart of the differences that separate Deleuze from his
contemporaries. Jacques Derrida, for instance, once wrote that Lyotard ‘has
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launched a categorical challenge against our epoch. . . . He is telling us: you have
not had done with, you will never have done with judgment’ (Derrida 1985: 96–
7). Intentional or not, it would not be difficult to read into this willful inversion
of Artaud’s phrase a direct challenge to Deleuze’s thought as well. For his part,
Derrida presented his own analysis (or deconstruction) of the theory of reflec-
tive judgment in his essay, ‘Force of law: the “mystical foundation of authority”’
(Derrida 1992: 25–7). The directions Deleuze and Derrida take their analysis of
judgement are indicative of two general trajectories in contemporary French
thought.
In Kant, a reflective judgement is a judgement that is made in the absence of
a rule, that is, without a determinate concept: the imagination becomes free at
the same time that the understanding becomes indeterminate. But what is the
condition that makes this ‘free play’ of the faculties possible? It is possible, Kant
says, only through the intervention of an Idea of reason. ‘Reflective judgment
would not be able to trace its passages were it not inspired by the unity and
systematicity that the suprasensible Ideas (of the Soul, the World, and God)
“project by analogy” into experience’ (Gualandi 1999: 119).6 If determinate
judgements operate under a rule or concept, reflective judgements rely on the
directive role of Ideas and their ‘analogical’ connections. One of the aims of the
Critique of Judgement is to analyze the manner in which transcendent Ideas are
presented in sensible nature through analogy (the sublime, symbolization,
genius and teleology).
But this is precisely the reason why Deleuze offers a strong critique of the
‘analogy of judgement’ in Difference and Repetition. Since reflective judgements
are grounded in Ideas (whereas determinate judgments are grounded in
concepts), the difference between theories of reflective judgement can be evalu-
ated in terms of the corresponding theory of Ideas. In Lyotard, for instance,
Ideas are fundamentally ‘unpresentable’. For Derrida, the judgements of the
law operate on the basis of an infinite and transcendent ‘Idea of justice’, in
relation to which the condition of possibility for any decision or reflective
judgement is its very impossibility. It is this element of transcendence, however,
that Deleuze refuses: in the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition (‘Ideas
and the synthesis of difference’), Deleuze attempts to develop a purely
immanent and differential theory of Ideas (1994: 168–221). It is this break with
transcendence that allows Deleuze to effect a corresponding break with the
doctrine of judgement. Immanent Ideas, in being actualized, are dramatized, but
the agent of this dramatization is not judgement but rather desire. ‘Desire is
productive’, writes Patton, ‘in the sense that it produces real connections’ (2000:
70). Or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, simply: ‘Desire is the set of passive
syntheses’ (1977: 26). In the realm of law or rights, Deleuze does not appeal to
the transcendence of an infinite idea of justice; the movement of the immanent
Idea is actualized in becomings and the production of affects – this is the process
of desire itself. Immanent Ideas in Deleuze in a sense remain ‘regulative’, but
only insofar as they pose problems, they are ‘problematizing’. Deleuzian Ideas
map out directions and vectors of synthesis (connection, conjunction,
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disjunction), which are actualized, not by a conscious judgement, but through
an unconscious process of desire (a ‘passive’ synthesis). This is why Deleuze
says the unconscious is not pre-given, but must itself be constructed: in the law,
it is the process of desire that constructs the movement from case to case, the
prolongation of singularities. This is also why Deleuze can say that the question
of human rights ‘is not a question of justice, it is a question of jurisprudence’,
that is, of desire (Deleuze 1995a: G).
This is a good example of the ‘labor of the concept’ one finds in Deleuze. It is a
change in the concept of an ‘Idea’ that allows Deleuze to ‘have done with judg-
ment’, and to replace the notion of a conscious reflective judgement (which is
guided analogically by a transcendent Idea, in the Kantian sense) with an uncon-
scious but productive process of desire (which effects the passive synthesis of an
immanent Idea, in the Deleuzian sense). Kant himself presents the Critique of
Practical Reason as an analysis of a ‘higher’ faculty of desire that is determined by
the representation of a pure form, namely, the pure form of a universal legislation
(the moral law) (see Deleuze 1984: 28–9). If a reflective judgement of beauty can
be presented as a ‘symbol’ of morality in the Critique of Judgement, it is because its
object can be taken as the analogue of an Idea of reason (a white lily is the analogue
of the Idea of innocence), and therefore can be said to ‘predispose’ us to morality.
Even in Kant, then, the function of the doctrine of reflective judgement is to point
us in the direction of the ‘higher’ faculty of desire, which is our ultimate destina-
tion as moral beings. Like Kant, Deleuze will insist on the fundamental role of
desire in ‘practical’ philosophy, but he will effect an inversion of Kant by synthe-
sizing desire, not with a transcendent Idea of universal legislation, but with an
immanent and differential Idea that operates through a prolongation of singulari-
ties. One of the aims of Anti-Oedipus, from this viewpoint, is to formulate criteria
to distinguish between legitimate (immanent) and illegitimate (transcendent)
syntheses of desire (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 75), and, in this sense, Anti-
Oedipus can be read as Deleuze and Guattari’s own version of the Critique of
Practical Reason. The immanent relation Deleuze establishes between a differen-
tial Idea of jurisprudence and the process of desire can thus be contrasted with the
aporetic relation Derrida establishes between an infinite Idea of justice and an
impossible decision or judgement. For Deleuze, the Idea constitutes the condition
of real experience, and not merely possible experience; for Derrida, the Idea
constitutes the condition of possibility of justice only by constituting its impossi-
bility at the same time. The differences between the two are profound. Patton’s
reflections seem to suggest that a concept of judgement might nonetheless be able
to be reformulated in Deleuzian terms, but it would certainly have to take into
account this conceptual movement of Deleuze’s thought.
Liberalism and the ‘social imaginary’
There is a final non-Deleuzian term that Patton imports into his analyses of
Deleuze, a notion that does not stem from the liberal tradition, but which can
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perhaps serve as a final example to demonstrate the scope of Patton’s own
project. This is the concept of the social imaginary (see Patton 2000: 72, 79, 80,
81, 89, 119, 126). The notion of social imaginary has been utilized by various
contemporary thinkers to refer to those imaginary constructions – such as
political fables, collective illusions, legal fictions, metaphors, myths and images
– which, while often unconscious and unthought, are nonetheless constitutive of
the embodied identity of individuals and collectivities. Spinoza, in particular,
emphasized the fundamental role of the imagination in social and political life.
As Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd have noted: 
Spinoza’s account of the imagination is not a theory about a ‘faculty’ but a
theory about a permanent structure through which human beings are consti-
tuted as such. . . . The strength of the social imaginary is that it constructs a
logic of its own – a logic which cannot be shaken or undermined simply by
demonstrating the falsity of its claims, its inherent contradictions or its
aporias.
 (Gatens and Lloyd 1999: 143; see also Gatens 1996: viii)
Given Deleuze’s indebtedness to Spinoza, one might expect to find in Deleuze’s
work a strongly developed theory of the imagination or the social imaginary. But
in fact this is not the case. Negotiations includes an interview entitled ‘Doubts
about the imaginary’, in which Deleuze asks the question: ‘Is “the imaginary” a
good concept?’ and finds that it is ‘a rather indeterminate notion’ (Deleuze
1995b: 65–6).7 Elsewhere, the reason Deleuze gives for having doubts about the
concept is that the processes he analyzes throughout his work – becomings, de-
and reterritorializations, flows, affects and so on – belong to the domain of the
real and not the imaginary (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 30, 83, 304–7).
In several passages, however, Patton mounts a quiet challenge to Deleuze’s
doubts, intriguingly suggesting that these real processes nonetheless have an
imaginary dimension. He equates Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the ‘socius’
or the ‘body without organs’ with a kind of social imaginary (Patton 2000: 71–2,
cf. 89: ‘the socius is the imaginary body of society as a whole’), and suggests that
what Deleuze and Guattari define as ‘becomings’, such as becoming-woman,
can take place in relation to the images found in the social imaginary (Patton
2000: 81). Patton does not develop these points in detail. Yet given his own
emphasis on the role of concepts and the need for their consistency, his claims
invite a number of interesting questions. How does Patton himself overcome
Deleuze’s ‘doubts about the imaginary’? How, within Deleuze’s own work, do
these ‘doubts about the imaginary’ relate to Deleuze’s own interest in the
analysis of images (images of thought, the images of cinema, etc.)? How might
Deleuze’s thought relate to works such as Gatens and Lloyd’s, Collective Imag-
inings: Spinoza, Past and Present (1999), Michèle LeDoeuff’s The Philosophical
Imaginary (1989), Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991), and
Cornelius Castoriadis’s The Imaginary Institution of Society (1987) – all of which
make use of the concept of the social imaginary in varying (and not necessarily
commensurate) manners? Most importantly, how could the concept of the social
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imaginary consistently connect with the revised liberal concepts Patton has
introduced into his reading of Deleuze (normativity, critical freedom, judge-
ment)?
These are large issues, and to my mind they remain genuinely open questions,
prompted by Patton’s admittedly passing appeal to the social imaginary. For my
part, it seems there are at least three aspects of Deleuze’s thought that might be
relevant to an analysis of the social imaginary. Patton explicitly addresses the
first aspect, which concerns the relation of images to embodiment (which admit-
tedly constitutes a small part of the theory of the social imaginary). It has often
been noted, for instance, that images of idealized bodies (in advertising and
television, as well as less obvious imaginaries) can affect, even if unconsciously,
my relation to my own body, to the point where I become willing to subject my
body to the demands of the image (e.g. via dieting, bodybuilding, surgery,
cosmetics, etc.). This can be seen as an instance of the more general problem of
desire, which Deleuze and Guattari have identified as ‘the fundamental problem
of political philosophy’: ‘Why do people fight for their servitude as stubbornly
as though it were their salvation?’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1977: 29). In this case:
why would I voluntarily subject my body to an idealized image to which I can
never conform, and whose real effect, in the end, is to produce in me the ‘sad’
affects of inadequacy and resentment? Although this phenomenon is common,
the mechanism by which is takes place is less so. How exactly does the social and
public production of images affect the private production of my personal
desires? Stated in broader terms, what is the relation between political economy
(social production) and libidinal economy (production of desires) – in short,
between Marx and Freud?
As Patton observes, this is a problem that is explicitly addressed in Anti-
Oedipus (Patton 2000: 68–9). A common response is to say that I somehow
‘internalize’ or ‘introject’ the information and connotations contained in the
images; and, conversely, that the images themselves are nothing more than
‘projections’ of the desires of those who consume them, to the point where the
producers of the images can claim that they are simply ‘giving people what they
want’. But the entirety of Anti-Oedipus is directed against this thesis: ‘The
Marx–Freud parallelism remains completely sterile and indifferent as long as it
is expressed in terms that make them introjections or projections of each other
without them ceasing to be utterly alien to each other’ (Deleuze and Guattari
1977: 28–9). Deleuze and Guattari’s claim is that the social production of images
(or imaginaries) and the production of desire are one and the same process, and
thus that there is no need to posit any mediating psychic operations such as
introjection, projection or sublimation to account for the power of images (or
any aspect of social production). Patton analyzes this famous (and complex)
thesis in his chapter on desire (Patton 2000: esp. 68–70), which precludes any
simple summary. But his analyses here link up with his earlier claims about the
general orientation of Deleuze’s philosophy: despite his doubts about the imag-
inary, Deleuze could no doubt acknowledge the existence of a social imaginary,
but his primary concern would be with the underlying processes that account for
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both its production and its effects (in this case, image and embodiment). For
Deleuze, as long as social production and desire are seen to be two different
processes, the actual operation of social imaginaries would remain a mystery.
The second aspect concerns the question: why is the imagination nonetheless
not a prominent concept in Deleuze philosophy? I would suggest that, in a
sense, the imagination does play an important role in Deleuze’s thought, but that
it appears in a form that perhaps owes as much to Kant as it does Spinoza. In the
schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a novel distinc-
tion between the reproductive imagination and what he calls the productive imag-
ination (1929: 180–7 (A137–47/B176–87)). The activity of the reproductive
imagination is to reproduce a concept in images: a plate, the sun or a wheel are
images of a circle, just as a taut string or a figure drawn on a blackboard may be
considered images of a line. But the activity of the productive imagination is
quite different: here the imagination produces a ‘schema’ that will allow me to
construct something round or straight in experience that conforms to the
concept. The schema is necessary, says Kant, because neither the concept nor
the image tell me how to produce a circle or a line in intuition. The concept may
allow me to recognize a straight line, but only a schema can tell me how it is
possible to construct a straight line in experience. Kant thus argues that ‘the
shortest path’ should not be understood as a predicate of the concept ‘straight
line’, but rather as a schema for constructing a straight line (‘follow the shortest
path between two points . . .’). As a rule of production, a schema must therefore
be seen as an aspect of lived experience, something that must be lived dynami-
cally, as a dynamic process, albeit in conformity with a concept.
 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze reformulated Kant’s theory of schemata
into a complex theory of ‘spatio-temporal dynamisms’ (manners of occupying
space and time), to which Deleuze gave a much broader sphere of application.8
In biology, for example, the concept of an animal can be determined by its
genera and specific differences, but what cannot be derived from the concept is
the way the animal inhabits space and time: its territory, the paths it follows, the
times it takes these paths, the traces it leaves in its territory, the excitations to
which it responds, the affects of which it is capable and so on. This is why
Deleuze exhibits such interest in the discipline of ‘ethology’ (and frequently
appeals to von Uexküll’s ethological analysis of the tick; see Uexküll 1957: 6–8),
which attempts to classify animals in terms of their spatio-temporal dynamisms,
that is, as blocs of space-time that are not only lived but ‘embodied’ (what can a
body do?). Similarly, ethnologists can be said to describe the spatio-temporal
dynamisms of humans to the degree that they describe their manners and affects
– dynamisms that will necessarily vary the generic concept ‘human’ (see
Deleuze 1978). Native Americans, for example, often died under colonialism
because they could not survive the diseases that were introduced by Europeans,
such as influenza: they were not capable of the same affects. At a more abstract
level, one of the aims of Capitalism and Schizophrenia was to develop a complex
typology of such dynamisms that are actualized in concrete social formations
and enter into varying combinations and interactions: primitive societies, states,
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nomads and capitalism all occupy space-time in different manners – forming
territories (primitive), striating space (states), occupying a smooth space
(nomads), deterritorializing and reterritorializing space (capitalism), etc.
Deleuze explains, for instance, that war-machines ‘have nothing to do with war
but with a particular way of occupying, taking up, space-time, or inventing new
space-times’ (1995b: 172, cf. 30). Moreover, the revolutionary potential he
ascribes to war-machines (or ‘metamorphosis-machines’, as Patton prefers to
call them) is derived from their capacity for construct new spatio-temporal
dynamisms. ‘People don’t take enough account’, Deleuze writes, pointing to one
example among many, ‘of how the PLO has had to invent a space-time in the
Arab world’ (1995b: 172). If the imagination plays a role in Deleuze’s political
philosophy, in other words, it seems to appear primarily under this form of the
productive imagination (production of spatio-temporal dynamisms), rather than
that of the reproductive imagination (production of images), though the two
roles of the imagination are obviously related.9 If this thesis is correct, then
Deleuze’s thought might open up a new way of thinking about the nature and
functioning of social imaginaries as ‘spatio-temporal dynamisms’.
The third aspect, finally, concerns the ways in which social imaginaries can be
transformed. One (and only one) Deleuzian response to this question would
address the political role of art (see Patton 2000: 72–3). What we encounter in
everyday life are images that have been reduced to the status of clichés –
conventions and opinions that are in the service of forces other than themselves
– and it is not difficult to produce works of art that merely reproduce such
conventions (the ‘culture industry’). The political act of resistance against such
ready-made images thus entails, in a sense, a struggle of image against image,
and Deleuze repeatedly emphasizes the ‘battle against clichés’ that artists must
undergo just to produce an image – not a ‘just’ image, as Godard says, but just an
image, any image.
To make an image from time to time: Can art, painting, and music have any
other goal, even if the contents of the image are quite meager, quite mediocre?
. . . . It is extremely difficult to make a pure and unsullied image, one that is
nothing but an image, by reaching the point where it emerges in all its
singularity.
 (Deleuze 1997: 158)
At various points in his work, Deleuze discusses the political effect of such
image making or ‘fabulating’, notably in his analyses of the status of Third
World political film making in The Time-Image (1989: 215–24), the role of the
image in Samuel Beckett’s work (1997: 152–74), and the battle against the cliché
in Francis Bacon (1981: 57–63). To be sure, the notion of the social imaginary
encompasses far more than artistic or informational images, but the political
function of art touches on the broad question of enigmatic link between artistic
creation and political change (the constitution of the people), both of which are
instances of the Deleuzian problematic concerning the conditions for the
production of the new.
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There is much else to be said of Patton’s book. Its strongest elements are certainly
its readings of Deleuze’s concepts and its overview of Deleuze’s philosophical
project, which will benefit all readers, beginning or advanced. But the more
creative aspect of the book, as I see it, is this somewhat clandestine ‘Pattonian’
project that is working out alongside the interpretation of Deleuze, of which we
will no doubt see more in the future. By forcing Deleuze’s thought into a confron-
tation with the liberal tradition, Patton is able to show the way towards a trans-
formation of such familiar concepts as normativity, freedom and judgement.
Moreover, Patton brings into his analyses other non-Deleuzian concepts – such as
the ‘social imaginary’ – which show that the scope of his own project goes beyond
the Deleuze–liberalism confrontation. The next task, one might imagine, would
be for Patton to show the consistency (endo- and exo-) of the conceptual apparatus
he himself is in the process of developing. The outlines of such an apparatus, I
have been suggesting, are already visible in Deleuze and the Political. Normativity
is redefined in terms of the movement of processes of ‘deterritorialization’; these
processes in turn constitute the condition for the exercise of ‘critical freedom’, that
is, the exercise of a judgement, outside pre-existing rules, which would be produc-
tive of the new (the creation of rights, the creation and transformation of social
imaginaries, the production of new space-times, etc.). Deleuze and the Political,
then, does not simply present a reading of Deleuze, or even Deleuze’s political
philosophy. It is at the same time an elaboration of Patton’s own project, one of
whose aims is to challenge traditional liberal conceptions of politics. Patton accom-
plishes this not simply by ‘applying’ Deleuze’s thought to liberal concepts, but
rather by forcing them into a becoming that itself produces something new,
something irreducible to either Deleuze or liberalism, but which constitutes
Patton’s own singular contribution to contemporary political thought.
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Notes
1 Routledge’s important ‘Thinking the Political’ series is edited by Keith Ansell-
Pearson and Simon Critchley, and thus far includes volumes on Foucault, Derrida,
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan and Lyotard.
2 In this respect, Patton’s primary precursors are Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri,
whose works, though overtly Marxist, also include important analysis of the liberal
tradition from a broadly Deleuzian perspective. See their influential Empire (2000), as
well as the earlier The Labors of Dionysus (1997).
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3 See Patton (2000: 9, 20, 49, 59, 87, 106, 135, 136, 144 note 11).
4 On-line anecdote from ‘bifo’, on the Spoon Collective’s ‘Deleuze-Guattari List’,
Monday 18 March 2002, <http://lists.village.virginia.edu/cgi-bin/spoons/
archive1.pl?list = deleuze-guattari.archive/deleuze-guattari.0203>, Message 111.
5 In his book on Kant, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze discusses the ambiguities of
judgement, which always depends on a certain accord of the faculties. See the short but
important section entitled ‘Is judgment a faculty?’ (Deleuze 1984: 58–61).
6 See also Gualandi’s book on Deleuze (1998). Lyotard’s and Deleuze’s respective
theories of judgement figure prominently in Gualandi’s analyses.
7 For an example of the kind of critique that has been leveled against the notion of the
imaginary, see Pierre Bourdieu’s Masculine Domination: 
The language of the ‘imaginary’, which one sees used somewhat recklessly here and
there, is even more inadequate than that of ‘consciousness’ [as in ‘consciousness
raising’] inasmuch as it inclines one in particular to forget that the dominant principle
of vision is not a simple mental representation, a fantasy (‘ideas in people’s heads’), an
ideology, but a system of structures durably embedded in things and in bodies,
 (Bourdieu 2001: 41, emphasis added)
Deleuze, however, ascribes to the concept of the imaginary precisely that affective and
embodied dimension that Bourdieu denies to it.
8 Although Deleuze considers the schematism to be among the most novel and important
innovations of Kantian thought, he himself takes the notion in a quite different direction. If
the ‘schema’ is outside the concept in Kant, what Deleuze calls a ‘dramatization’ is internal to
Ideas in the Deleuzian sense: ‘Everything changes when the dynamisms are posited no longer
as schemata of concepts but as dramas of Ideas’ (Deleuze 1994: 218). Under a similar inspiration,
Pierre Bourdieu, throughout his work, distinguishes between ‘categories or cognitive struc-
tures’ and ‘schemes or dispositions’ (the habitus) (see, e.g., Bourdieu 2001: 8–9).
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